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Chapter 7
Religious Non-Affiliation: Expelled by the Right
William V. Trollinger, University of Dayton
Abstract: For the past century the bulk of white evangelicalism has been tightly linked to a very
conservative politics. But in response to social and cultural changes in the 1960s and 1970s,
conservative white evangelicalism organized itself into the Christian Right, in the process
attaching itself to and making itself indispensable to the Republican Party. While the Christian
Right has enjoyed significant political success, its fusion of evangelicalism/Christianity with a
particular right-wing politics – which includes white nationalism, hostility to immigrants,
unfettered capitalism, and intense homophobia – has driven many Americans (particularly,
young Americans) to disaffiliate from religion altogether. In fact, the quantitative and qualitative
evidence make it clear that the Christian Right has been a (perhaps the) primary reason for the
remarkable rise of the religious “nones” in the past three decades. More than this, the Christian
Right is, in itself, a sign of secularization.

This would seem to be the season of triumph of evangelical Christians. Despite a nearly
continuous series of assertions from scholars and political commentators that the Christian Right
(which can usefully be thought of as the evangelical Right) was dead or nearly dead or soon to be
dead,1 over the last four decades it has proven to be the most reliable constituency in the
Republican Party. At the national level the elections of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush
were evidence of their clout, but the great pay-off came in 2016, when 81% of white evangelicals
supported Donald Trump for president, thus ensuring his election. Trump filled his cabinet with
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conservative evangelicals, including Ben Carson, Betsy DeVos, Rick Perry, Mike Pompeo, Jeff
Sessions, and, of course, Vice President Mike Pence. Christian Right leaders such as Robert
Jeffress of the First Baptist Church of Dallas and Jerry Falwell, Jr. of Liberty University
routinely find themselves on the national stage, excusing or minimizing what many see as
Trump’s racism, misogyny, and sexual immorality while simultaneously proclaiming Trump’s
achievements as the man to make America Great and Christian again. Finally, and thanks in
good part to the influence of the Christian Right, one of America’s two major political parties
opposes LGBTQ rights, bristles at feminism, denies climate change (and/or the role of humans in
climate change and/or the negative effects of climate change), and resolutely ignores structural
racism and the misery of those at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder.
Add to these political triumphs the fact that for decades scholars of American religion
(most famously, Dean Kelley, in his book Why Conservative Churches are Growing2) have made
the case that evangelical churches were immune to the numerical free fall that has afflicted
mainline Protestantism since the 1960s. In fact, American evangelicalism has been exhibit A in
the case that the United States is the exception to the secularization that has swept the rest of the
Western world.
All this to say that American evangelicalism would seem to have won the day. And yet,
as Robert P. Jones and Daniel Cox have noted in America’s Changing Religious Identity:
Findings from the 2016 American Values Atlas, while “white evangelical Protestants were once
thought to be bucking a longer trend, . . . over the past decade their numbers have dropped
dramatically.” The percentage of Americans who are white evangelicals has shrunk dramatically
in the last decade, from 23% in 2006 to 17% in 2017. In the same 11 years white mainline
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Protestants dropped from 18% to 13% of the population, while white Catholics dropped from
16% to 11%.3
Not only are Americans rapidly disaffiliating from religion, but they are also rapidly
disaffiliating from evangelicalism in rapidly increasing numbers. Not to put too fine a point on it,
the conviction that evangelicalism is the bulwark against religious nonaffiliation in the United
States has simply proven to be wrong. And so, we are left with an apparent conundrum. On the
one hand, the Christian Right is triumphant, with its president in the White House, and with the
Republican Party in its thrall. On the other hand, the numbers of white evangelicals are rapidly
shrinking, in proportions similar to non-evangelical Protestants and Catholics: political success,
but religious failure.
What is so interesting about this situation is that it is not, actually, a conundrum. Instead,
it seems these two phenomena, evangelical political success and the shrinking of white
evangelicalism, are related. That is to say, the Christian Right, specifically, its success in
conflating evangelicalism/Christianity with conservative culture war politics, appears to be a
primary factor in the shrinking of white evangelicalism in particular and religious disaffiliation
in the United States in general. But we can go further than this. The Christian Right is not simply
a major contributor to secularization in the United States. It is itself a sign of secularization.
Evangelicalism and Political Conservatism
The story of evangelicalism and the Christian Right4 has its origins in the latter decades
of the nineteenth century. In these years, a constellation of ideas challenged traditional Protestant
understandings of the Bible and Christianity. Darwinism raised questions about the Genesis story
of creation (six days?), God’s role in the creation process, and the nature of human beings.
Historicism (also known as higher criticism) treated the Bible as a historical document,
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highlighting the Bible’s inconsistencies and errors while also raising questions about the
supernatural origins of the biblical text. The Social Gospel de-emphasized the importance of the
fine points of Christian doctrine, instead emphasizing that true Christianity involved living out
Jesus’ teachings and working for social justice.
Many Protestants had no trouble adjusting to some or all of these ideas. But some
Protestants were horrified. In response, conservative theologians developed the doctrine of
biblical inerrancy, which holds that the Bible contains no errors, and that it is factually accurate
in everything it teaches, including what it says about history and science. Biblical inerrancy
swept through conservative Protestantism, and with it a second set of ideas, apocalyptic
premillennialism, that held that the Bible is also accurate in what it says about the future. In its
most popular version, apocalyptic premillennialism claimed that if you read the strange biblical
books of Daniel and Revelation “literally,” you learn the following: that the world and the church
is becoming increasingly decadent; that as the “end times” are approaching, the Jews will return
to Israel; that at the beginning of the “final days,” Christ will come in the air (i.e., “the rapture”)
to retrieve the true Christians; that the antichrist will then reign over the earth for seven years
(i.e., “the tribulation”); and, finally, that Christ and the true believers will return to slaughter the
enemy hordes (including Jews who have not converted) and establish the millennial kingdom of
God.
It is important to note that, besides establishing that the Bible is literally accurate even
when it comes to predicting the future, and besides establishing that history will end in ghastly
violence on a global scale, apocalyptic premillennialism also establishes that the Social Gospel is
absolutely unchristian. Social reform efforts are not only worthless, despite the best efforts of
misguided humans, the world will not improve, but they invite the expansion of an increasingly
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powerful government that would inevitably suppress religious expression. More than this, an
emphasis on social reform detracts from the primary task of saving souls from eternal damnation.
As a result, the true task of the Christian is to obey the Bible, get others to do the same, and
reject government proposals designed to help the poor and advance racial equality.
A series of Bible and prophecy conferences ensured that by the turn of the century,
millions of American evangelicals held to biblical inerrancy and apocalyptic premillennialism.
The publication of the Scofield Reference Bible (1909; 2nd ed. 1917) and The Fundamentals (12
vols., 1910-1915) further embedded these ideas in the evangelical consciousness, in the process
advancing the culture war notion of an America divided between true Christians holding to
orthodoxy and an enemy that had or was in the process of abandoning the faith. However, there
was not yet a movement. Then came the Great War. For many of these conservative Protestants,
Germany’s devolution into barbarism, which is how U.S. government propaganda encouraged
them to understand Germany, was due to Germany’s widespread acceptance of Darwinian
evolution and historicist explanations of the Bible. More than this, evangelicals holding to
apocalyptic premillennialism saw the British capture of Jerusalem in 1918 as thrilling evidence
that the end of history was in sight, as it meant that the Jews could start returning to historic
Israel.
In May 1919 these conservative evangelicals were horrified by the fact that liberal ideas
almost destroyed western civilization. Energized by the postwar Red Scare and its anti-radical
witch hunt, evangelicals were thrilled that they the faithful were on the right side of history. They
gathered in Philadelphia to create the World’s Christian Fundamentals Association (WCFA). Led
by the Baptist firebrand, William Bell Riley, this organization embarked on a crusade to do the
following: establish biblical inerrancy and apocalyptic premillennialism as the standard for
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Christian faith; rid American Protestantism of liberal ideas and pastors; cleanse American public
schools of Darwinian evolution and other dangerous ideas; and, return America to its former
status as a Christian Nation. In a very real sense, the modern Christian Right has its origins here,
with the creation of the fundamentalist movement among American evangelicals.
But the fundamentalist crusade of the 1920s did not go well. For one thing, while the
fundamentalists were quite successful in fomenting “controversies” in major Protestant
denominations, they failed to capture control of even one of these religious bodies. Their
campaigns among Northern Baptists and Presbyterians, which is where they concentrated their
efforts, did not result in the establishment of fundamentalist creedal statements and did not
achieve the removal of theological liberals and moderates from mission posts, seminaries, and
churches.
As it became clear that these denominational efforts were not going well, conservative
evangelicals quickly turned to politics, pressuring state governments to rid public schools of
evolutionary teaching. In 1925, Tennessee passed the Butler Act, which made it illegal “to teach
any theory that denies the Story of Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bible, and to teach
instead that man has descended from a lower order of animal.” Science teacher John Thomas
Scopes, with the support of the American Civil Liberties Union, challenged the law. Scopes was
convicted, but many or most of the reporters covering the Scopes Trial (much more a media
circus than an actual trial) shone an unfavorable light on the fundamentalists and their crusade to
“right America.” The ridicule encouraged many scholars and journalists to conclude that, despite
the trial’s outcome, fundamentalism was an embarrassing case study of cultural ignorance that
would soon vanish from the American scene.
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They were wrong. Not only did states (primarily in the South) continue to consider antievolution legislation, but the fundamentalist movement thrived and expanded at the local level,
with churches (some of which were independent, some of which were part of newly-emergent
fundamentalist denominations) nourished by a network of Bible institutes, mission agencies,
publishing houses, and radio stations. Still, the taint of backwardness acquired in the Scopes
Trial remained. In response, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, some (not all) of these
fundamentalists renamed themselves, borrowing from their heritage to call themselves “neoevangelicals,” or, in time, “evangelicals.”
While the nineteenth-century evangelical movement was noted for its commitment to
abolitionism, women’s rights, and other social reform efforts, “neo-evangelicals,”
notwithstanding the name change, remained firmly committed to political conservatism and
opposed to the Social Gospel. In fact, in the decades after the Scopes Trial, the commitment to
political conservatism intensified. Not only were fundamentalists appalled by the New Deal and
the establishment of the “welfare state” as an unwarranted intrusion into the workings of
capitalism, but many read it through apocalyptic lenses that suggested Roosevelt and company
were working to put into place an all-powerful state that served as a harbinger of the Antichrist’s
one world government.
The Cold War only heightened these anxieties, with Christian America faced off against
atheistic communism, and with an ever-present threat of nuclear warfare that fit almost
seamlessly into the end-times scenarios of apocalyptic premillennialism. While the political and
cultural turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s moved a small minority of evangelicals leftward, most
fundamentalists and evangelicals remained firmly on the right side of the political spectrum. To
quote from Righting America, they “decried the antiwar protests and the civil rights movement,
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opposed . . . the expansion of the New Deal, adamantly condemned the ‘sexual revolution’ and
feminism, attacked [the] U.S. Supreme Court [for] prohibiting institutionalized school prayer and
legalizing abortion, and blasted the Internal Revenue Service’s efforts to remove tax-exempt
status from Christian schools that discriminated on the basis of race.”5
In short, in the decades after World War I, many or most American evangelicals were
staunch and reliable and sometimes quite vocal political conservatives. But they had not yet been
galvanized into an organized political movement; most important, they had not yet been attached
to one particular political party. This changed in the late 1970s, when political operatives
connected with the Ronald Reagan presidential campaign intentionally and aggressively worked
to mobilize these politically conservative evangelicals into a reliable Republican voting bloc.
This process of “politicization” began with Jerry Falwell and his “Moral Majority,” which
certainly played a role in the election and re-election of Ronald Reagan.
Over time the Christian Right became a sophisticated political force, with a host of
national organizations such as the Christian Coalition, Concerned Women of America, and Focus
on the Family that were enthusiastically supported by a network of evangelical churches,
schools, and the like. Both the confirmation of Clarence Thomas as Supreme Court justice in
1991 and the election of George W. Bush as president in 2000 owed much to the aggressive
efforts of this political network. By the beginning of the 21st century, the Christian Right had
established itself as the most significant constituency within the Republican Party.
So, it is that, beginning in the 1980s and continuing to the present, evangelical leaders
and pastors have publicly and aggressively melded their religious identities and their political
identities. They have made it quite explicit that to be a Bible-believing Christian necessarily
means that one is on the right edges of the political spectrum, holds ultra-conservative views on a
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variety of political topics, and is staunchly Republican. Regarding all of this, and particularly the
fusing of Protestant evangelicalism and the Republican Party, it is important to understand that
this marks something of a change. Yes, conservative evangelicalism has been linked to
conservative politics since the early twentieth century and, especially, since the 1919 founding of
the World’s Christians Fundamentals Association. Yes, fundamentalists did not retreat from
politics or political concerns with the demise of their 1920s crusades. That said, there was also
some sense that politics was a second-order priority, given that (until the 1960s and 1970s)
America was “safely Christian,” and given that what mattered most of all was saving souls from
the fires of hell.
So while it was presumed that the right religious commitments would also mean the right
political commitments, it was not made to be an absolute necessity. This was the evangelicalism
of my childhood and youth. While I chafed at the political commitments held by the vast
majority in my evangelical church and at my evangelical college, while I could not bear the
predominance of anti-civil rights, antifeminist, pro-war, and pro-Nixon sentiments, I also was not
made to feel as if my left-of-center politics necessarily rendered me unchristian. To give a
specific example, at Campus Crusade’s Explo ’72 in Dallas, described on the cover of Life
magazine as “The Great Jesus Rally,” there were young evangelicals such as myself who chanted
“Stop the War,” and there were literature tables where one could gather antiwar material and sign
petitions calling on the United States to get out of Vietnam. While we were a tiny minority,
easily absorbed by the sea of conservative evangelicals, I think it is fair to say that we were seen
more as weird curiosities, and less as antichristian pariahs, for opposing GOP orthodoxy.6
But since the 1970s, the relationship between (much of) white evangelicalism and
conservative politics has seen a significant discursive shift, with the emergence of a Christian
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Right that insists that Bible-believing Christians will necessarily vote Republican, and that true
Christianity entails, even consists of, adherence to a particular form of conservative politics. It
should go without saying that this involves much more than simply the desire to overturn Roe v.
Wade. Key components of Christian Right political ideology include:
•

a virulent opposition to same-sex marriage and transgender accommodations, so virulent
that spending a few minutes on some evangelical websites suggests that the focus on
combating the LGBTQ “menace” verges on obsession.7

•

a fear of and antipathy toward immigrants combined with a desire to “tighten the
borders,” all of which is reflected in the 2018 Pew Research Center Religious Typology,
which reveals that “fully two-thirds” of “God-and-Country Believers” (who are
disproportionately evangelical) say “immigrants are a threat to American values and
customs, the largest share of any group.”8

•

a commitment to maintaining White America in the face of changing demographic
realities, a commitment that owes much to the fact that (as noted by historian Seth
Dowland) its “identity [was] forged in the contexts of Jim Crow segregation.” This has
been manifested both in the widespread support of white evangelicals for Donald Trump
and an unwillingness to recognize the pervasive nature of institutional racism (which has
led black evangelicals to question their identification as “evangelical”).9

•

a deep-seated Christian nationalism that is, to quote the historian John Fea, “rooted in
nostalgia for a bygone [and mythologized] Christian golden age,” and that, according to a
2018 Sociology of Religion article by Andrew Whitehead, Samuel Perry, and Joseph
Baker, is the best explanation for why white evangelicals voted for Donald Trump.10
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All of this is within the framework of the “culture war,” with the binary logic that this
entails. True Christians are on the right side of this war, defending a set of particular religious
and political views; on the other side of this war, holding dissenting views, is the not Christian or
unChristian or antiChristian enemy. To adopt terminology used by social theorists Ernesto
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, spokespersons for the Christian Right have created a hegemonic
discourse by articulating “chains of equivalence,” in which one set of “truths” is set in an
antagonistic and absolute opposition to a set of “untruths.”11
Christian Right and Religious Nonaffiliation
It is not a stretch to say that many or most white evangelicals in the United States have
been convinced that there is a necessary and inseparable connection between Christian
commitments and conservative political commitments. But it should not be surprising that many
political moderates and liberals have been similarly persuaded that to identify as Christian is to
identify as an intolerant right-wing culture warrior. And many of these political moderates and
liberals, particularly those who have had weak attachments to religion and religious institutions,
have been so convinced that they have disaffiliated from religion altogether.
Michael Hout and Claude S. Fischer, who have done the best work12 on this topic,13 make
clear that the “political backlash” in response to the Christian Right fits very well with the
evidence that the younger the generational cohort, the more likely individuals are to claim “no
religion” when asked for religious preference. In seeking to explain why succeeding generations
have proven to be increasingly disaffiliated from religion, the authors discovered that attitudes
about sexuality (particularly regarding premarital sex and homosexuality), recreational drug use,
and autonomy (i.e., valuing thinking for oneself as opposed to valuing obedience) are the
primary predictors of the differences between cohorts when it comes to religious preferences.14
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In this assessment, Hout and Fischer are building on Robert Putnam and David Campbell’s
observations in American Grace (observations that are also based on analysis of the General
Social Survey data) that “those millennials whose views on homosexuality are more tolerant are
more than twice as likely to be religious nones as their statistically similar peers who are
conservative on homosexuality.”15 All of this suggests that the “religiously-inflected . . . politics
of personal morality”16 are what has alienated liberals and moderates, and, with each generation,
in increasing numbers. In short, and as the authors observe in their conclusion:
Once the American public began connecting organized religion to the conservative
political agenda—a connection that Republican politicians, abortion activists, and
religious leaders all encouraged . . . —many political liberals and moderates who seldom
or never attend services quit expressing a religious preference when survey interviewers
asked about it. New calculations here . . . not only confirm the correlational pattern but go
further to support the inference that political backlash is actually causing some of the
religious disaffiliation.17
Hout and Fischer are careful to couch their 2014 conclusions in the form of inference.
But as reported in a 2018 American Journal of Political Science article, “Putting Politics First:
The Impact of Politics on American Religious and Secular Orientations,” David Campbell et al.
put this inference to the test. In the most fascinating part of their study, the researchers provided
respondents with fictional articles about an invented congressional race in another state. In the
control articles, there are no references to religion, but in the other articles evangelical religious
references are added. As the authors observe, if it is correct that (much of) white
evangelicalism’s tight connection to the Republican Party is producing a good portion of the
religious disaffiliation in contemporary America, “then when Democrats are exposed to a
Republican candidate who is associated with religion, they will become more likely to identify as
Nones.” This is particularly the case given that many Nones are “’liminals’ who may or may not
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think of themselves as having a religious identity depending on the context.” The results of their
experiment combined with their analysis of Secular America Survey data are striking:
The close association of religion and the Republican Party creates cognitive dissonance
among Democrats. Many Democrats resolve the dissonance by becoming Nones. Further,
the mingling of religion and partisan politics leads to polarization, as Republicans and
conservatives grow increasingly religious and Democrats and liberals become more
passively and actively secular. Importantly, these processes take shape only when voters
perceive the mixture of religion and politics, particularly in the GOP—the causal
mechanism proposed, but to date untested, in the literature.18
Boston University’s Stephen Prothero, writing for Politico in early 2018, does not hold
back in driving home the significance of this argument:
The [author’s emphasis] most significant development in American religion in recent
years is the shocking rise of the religiously unaffiliated . . . who now account for roughly
one quarter of all Americans. This increasing distance from religious institutions is
accompanied by increasing distance from religious beliefs and practices . . . There are
many reasons for this decline in religious believing and engaging. But the most important
in my view is the increasing identification of the Christian churches with right-wing
politics.19
What makes this argument particularly significant from a scholarly point of view is that
while social scientists have long understood that religion affects political behavior, they have not
taken seriously the notion that the influence could go the other way (i.e., politics affects
religion). As Paul Djupe, Jacob Neiheisel, and Anand Sokhey point out in a 2018 article in the
American Journal of Political Science, “scholars have largely characterized religion . . . as an
‘unmoved mover’ . . . At the very least, religion has typically been treated, almost without
question, as independent of the political process.”20 The argument (made by Hout and Fischer, as
well as others)21 that the Christian Right (or, political backlash produced by the Christian Right)
is a primary reason for the rapid increase in religious “nones” upends this scholarly consensus.
The notion that the effects could go both ways, that religion affects politics and politics affects
religion, has serious ramifications for our understanding of both politics and religion.
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Djupe et al. add nuance to Hout and Fischer’s argument by arguing that it is important to
distinguish between congregational disaffiliation and religious disidentification, i.e., leaving a
congregation as opposed to asserting that one has no preference when it comes to religion (see
Baker in this volume). Focusing on congregational disaffiliation, and making use of national and
local election data sets as well as the 2012 Portraits of American Life Study, the authors argue
that the Christian Right is indeed “driving congregants out of the pews, which certainly jells with
familiar narratives.”22 But the question remains: what sorts of pews, that is, what sorts of
churches, are these congregants leaving? Not surprisingly, for an individual to disaffiliate from a
church in reaction to the fusing of religion with conservative politics, the church in question
would most likely be one in which the Christian Right agenda, in one way or another, is being
promoted by church leadership and/or an influential cohort of church members. That is to say,
the sort of churches that would produce congregational disaffiliation because of the Christian
Right would most likely be evangelical churches.
As Djupe et al. discovered in their research, “the Christian Right drives out those who
disagree with the movement those [often marginally connected congregants] who disagree with
the movement and are likely to experience disagreement in their congregations—that is,
evangelical Republicans [authors’ emphasis].”23 Interestingly, and also not surprisingly, the
notion of congregational disaffiliation fits well with the argument that the Christian Right is
driving people to disidentify with Christianity. Once people are disconnected from their
congregation, they are then more likely to respond to Christian Right pronouncements equating
religion with right-wing politics by taking the next step to express themselves as having no
religious preference at all.
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This argument is an excellent reminder that the Christian Right is not simply pushing
non-evangelicals into religious nonaffiliation. The Christian Right is also causing great turmoil
within white evangelicalism itself. Over the past five decades, there has existed a small but
persistent “evangelical left.” Best exemplified by Jim Wallis (who was deeply involved in
protesting the Vietnam War at the aforementioned Explo ’72)24 and Sojourners magazine, these
left-leaning evangelicals have consistently argued that American evangelicalism needs to jettison
its political conservatism and return to its nineteenth-century roots, in the process emphasizing
the teachings of Jesus and progressive social reform. But as the contemporary Christian Right
has tightened its grip on white evangelicalism, the evangelical left has become increasingly
active in its efforts to “save” evangelicalism.
Perhaps the best example of this is the Red Letter Christians (RLC), a name taken from
the fact that in some Bibles the words of Jesus are in red. This organization was founded in 2006
by Tony Campolo and Shane Claiborne and includes evangelical left luminaries such as Wallis
and William Barber. According to the organization’s description of itself:
The goal of Red Letter Christians is simple: To take Jesus seriously by endeavoring to
live out His radical, counter-cultural teachings as set forth in Scripture, and especially
embracing the lifestyle prescribed in the Sermon on the Mount . . . What we are asserting,
therefore, is that we have committed ourselves first and foremost to doing what Jesus
said.
As a sign of an increasingly aggressive approach, in April 2018 the RLC held a “Red Letter
Revival” in Lynchburg, Virginia, near Liberty University, where “they organized to pray against
‘toxic evangelicalism,’ and to offer a spiritual challenge to Liberty President Jerry Falwell, Jr.”25
It is possible that the RLC, Sojourners, and related organizations and publications may be
keeping some individuals inside the evangelical fold. Nevertheless, the bleeding continues apace.
Returning to a point made at the beginning of the chapter, over the past decade white
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evangelicalism has been shrinking at rates similar to mainline Protestantism and Catholicism.
Making use of Public Religion Research Institute data, Daniel Cox notes that approximately one
third of white Americans raised as evangelicals leave their faith; more than this, “about 60
percent of those who leave end up joining another faith tradition, while 40 percent give up on
religion altogether.” 26
The departure from evangelicalism is even more striking among the young, with 39% “no
longer identify[ing] as such in adulthood.” Put another way, white evangelicalism is aging. And
the numbers are dramatic. As reported in America’s Changing Religious Identity, as of 2016, the
median age of white evangelicals was 55, with 30% of white evangelicals over the age of 65.
Only 11% of white evangelicals are between the ages of 18 and 29 (the same percentage holds
true for white Catholics, while 14% of white mainline Protestants are under the age of 30). Only
8% of American adults between the ages of 18 and 29 are white evangelicals. In “Are White
Evangelicals Sacrificing the Future in Search of the Past?” Cox argues that this aging of white
evangelicalism is directly related to the fact that “nostalgia seems to be animating much of white
evangelical politics.” The nostalgic politics of the Christian Right is leading evangelicals further
and further “away, politically and culturally, from the American mainstream” when it comes to
matters of sexuality, and particularly when it comes to the young. As Cox argues:
While it is difficult to draw a direct connection between the numerical decline of white
evangelical Protestants and their increasing isolation on sexual morality, the views of
former evangelical Protestants provide some important clues. Analysis of a 2014 Pew
study finds that former white evangelicals are far more likely than current white
evangelicals to favor same-sex marriage (60 percent vs. 24 percent) and believe that
society should accept homosexuality (67 percent vs. 32 percent). They are also
substantially younger.27
Young evangelicals may be fleeing, but conservative evangelical leaders are not
wavering when it comes to matters of sexuality. Instead, they are doubling down. In August 2017
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the Council on Biblical Manhood and Womanhood (an organization that promotes the notion
that men are to exercise “headship” over women in the home and church)28 released the
Nashville Statement. With over 150 original signatories—including Christian Right stalwarts
such as James Dobson, Paige Patterson, Tony Perkins, and James Robison, as well as later
signers such as Ken Ham – the statement begins with a lament that “as Western culture has
become increasingly post-Christian,” it has rejected the idea that “our true identity, as male and
female persons, is given by God.” In response, the Nashville Statement affirms “divinely
ordained differences between male and female,” rejects homosexual marriage as well as
“homosexual or transsexual self-conception,” and—employing the binary logic of the culture
war—blasts Christians who differ with them on these issues: “The approval of homosexual
immorality or transgenderism is [not] a matter of moral indifference about which otherwise
faithful Christians should agree to disagree.”29
In an October 2017 Christian Science Monitor article, tellingly entitled “Amid
Evangelical Decline, Growing Split Between Young Christians and Church Elders,” reporter
Harry Bruinius quotes Denny Burk, president of the Council on Biblical Manhood and
Womanhood, as describing the Nashville Statement as: “A line in the sand . . . A person may
follow Jesus, or he may pursue sexual immorality . . . One path leads to eternal life, and the other
does not.” But the Rev. Corey MacPherson, evangelical chaplain at Colgate University, had a
very different take on the statement:
Look at the timing, my goodness, what was it, a week after Charlottesville? There are all
these other issues going on in our world, issues of justice and reconciliation, which are at
the heart of Christianity, and here is a statement that isn’t about reconciliation at all.
Younger Evangelicals, especially, they just don’t want to be a part of that – that’s not
what they want to be associated with.30
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“That’s not what they want to be associated with.” In American Grace Putnam and
Campbell, in a discussion of the rapid and stunning disaffection from religion on the part of
youth in the United States, explained that by the early 21st century, young Americans had come
to view religion “as judgmental, homophobic, hypocritical, and too political.”31 American Grace
appeared in 2010. Six years later Donald Trump was elected president, thanks in great part to
white evangelicals. Not only has the Christian Right tied itself to him, but as of April 2018, white
evangelicals were more supportive of Trump than ever, with one poll finding that they gave him
a 75% favorability rating. All this despite, to quote PRRI’s Robert Jones, “revelations of taped
boasts of sexual assault during the 2016 campaign, moral equivocation about white supremacy . .
. [and now] two alleged extramarital affairs.”32 As Washington Post columnist Jennifer Rubin
observed, “At a time when a great many evangelical conservatives have abandoned any pretense
of concern for ethical behavior or religious values in exchange for political influence and power .
. . the state of religion continues to slide.”33
For a vivid example of religion’s slide in the age of Trump, see what Rod Dreher (author
of The Benedict Option) had to say about a September 2017 lunch meeting he had with
conservative evangelicals. After discussing his book at some length, Dreher asked them what
they thought about the “Nashville Statement” (which Dreher supports). He was stunned when
they informed him that it was “a pastoral disaster,” thanks in good part to “The Trump factor: so
many white Evangelicals voted overwhelmingly for Trump that they surrendered the ability to
speak with moral credibility on anything having to do with sexuality”:
A couple of people in college ministry were at the table. They said it is impossible to
overstate how alienating the enthusiastic support their parents gave to Donald Trump was
to their students. A number of college students have left the church over it . . . For a lot of
them, their parents’ backing of Donald Trump made everything they had been taught as
kids about Christianity a lie . . . Listening to these pastors and laypeople talking about the
Trump effect on younger Christians was quite sobering to me. An older pastor said that it
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is impossible to separate the Nashville Statement from the massive support white
Evangelicals gave to Trump. Impossible to separate, I mean, in the mind of the young:
‘All they see is a bunch of leaders of a movement who voted for a sexually corrupt man
like Donald Trump who are now trying to take a public stand on sexual morality for gays.
It’s totally hypocritical to them. I don’t know how the Nashville drafters and signers
didn’t see this coming.34
The quantitative and qualitative evidence strongly support the argument that the Christian
Right has been a primary reason for the remarkable rise of the religious “nones” in the United
States since the 1990s. And while it may be too early to say with certainty, it is very easy to
imagine, the above anecdote suggests as much, that the post-2016 data will reveal that the
Christian Right is driving even greater numbers of Americans to declare that they have no
religious preference. Whether or not “irony” is the right word to apply here, one cannot escape
noticing that a movement that so stridently opposes the secularizing of America is actually
helping to accelerate this secularization.35
Christian Right and Secularization
The mounting evidence that the Christian Right is a significant driver of religious
nonaffiliation in the United States leads to one final point, and that has to do with the hotly
contested thesis that (to oversimplify the formulation) modernization in the West corrodes
religious faith and practice. For the past three decades, critics have used the United States, a
modern Western nation with high levels of religious participation, as the counterexample that
decisively undercuts the secularization model (see chapter 13). As David Voas and Mark Chaves
point out in a 2016 American Journal of Sociology article, “the state of American religion is not
the only evidence that critics marshal against the secularization thesis, but the religious situation
in the United States often, perhaps always, plays a key role in the criticism.”36 But as Voas and
Chaves go on to argue, the past four decades of data regarding religious adherence in America
(summarized nicely in this volume’s introduction) makes it very clear that the United States is, in
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fact, not an outlier among Western nations. On the contrary, the United States confirms the
secularization thesis for two reasons:
First, American religiosity has in fact been declining for decades, and second, that decline
has been produced by the same generational patterns that lie behind religious decline
elsewhere in the West: each successive cohort is less religious than the preceding one.
Taken together, these two facts mean that recent trends in religiosity are remarkably
similar throughout the Western world, including the United States.37
This would seem a compelling argument. But Hout and Fischer point out that the increase
in religious nonaffiliation has not been accompanied by a substantial increase in agnostics and
atheists; in fact, not only do many of the “nones” believe in God and life after death, but
according to the 2012 data, 37 percent of the religiously nonaffiliated pray at least once a week,
with 22 percent praying daily. More than this, the fact that it is the Christian Right that is driving
much of religious nonaffiliation in the United States is, according to Hout and Fischer, at odds
with traditional secularization theory, which stipulates “religion’s irrelevance, not its
prominence, as the mechanism for waning identification.” In other words, religion remains quite
relevant in the United States, even as people move away from religion. For Hout and Fischer, it
is this polarization, and not secularization, that “affected religious preferences,” as “people
expressed either a strong preference for a specific religion or none at all.”38
Expanding on this point, Landon Schnabel and Sean Bock have argued that, while they
agree with Voas and Chaves that there has been a “steep downward trend in average
religiousness,” the fact is that “only moderate religion has declined, and that the intensity of
American religion is persistent and exceptional.” Instead of religion becoming irrelevant in
America, what we have is “the polarization of religion in the United States.” According to
Schnabel and Bock, as “American religion has become increasingly politicized,” thanks in great
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part to the Christian Right, the “backlash appears to be emptying the more moderate categories
of American religion.”39
Are Schnabel and Bock correct? Does the ongoing relevance of the Christian Right in the
United States, its significant role in creating religious polarization and thus its significant role in
producing religious “nones,” undermine the notion of American secularization? While it is
beyond the scope and purpose of this chapter to address the merits of this particular assertion, it
is striking as to what this argument leaves out. That is, there is no attention here to the nature, the
substance of the Christian Right itself.
One way some secularization theorists have responded to the apparent anomaly of
American religiosity has been to suggest, as Voas and Chaves point out, “that American
religiosity is somehow not as religious as it appears to be.”40 This argument goes back five
decades. In his 1966 work, Religion in Secular Society, Bryan Wilson noted that “whereas in
England secularization has been seen in the abandonment of the Churches . . . in America it has
been seen in the absorption of the Churches by the society, and their loss of distinctive religious
content,” as “religion has placed its common values at the service of the political and social
institutions of the nation”; the following year Stewart Luckmann (in The Invisible Religion)
observed that there had been “a radical inner change in American church religion,” in which it
had become “more ‘modern’ . . . by undergoing a process of internal secularization.”41 Writing in
the 1960s, Wilson and Luckmann focused their attention on mainline Protestant churches. But as
Steve Bruce noted at the end of the century, internal secularization had also come to conservative
Protestantism: “as the conservatives have . . . become more affluent, they have also lost a great
deal of what made them distinctive . . . the psychologized gospel of ‘positive thinking’ that was
anathema to conservatives in the 1950s and 1960s is now well established in fundamentalist and
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Pentecostalist circles, and much of the behavioral distinctiveness that marked those groups off
has also gone.” (163) Praising Bryan Wilson’s prescience, in 2011 Bruce observed that:
It is easy to be misled by the continued popularity of religious rhetoric and suppose that
Americans are as religious as ever they were. In addition to the evidence of church
decline, we need to appreciate the extent to which the content of American Christianity
has been secularized.42
Wilson, Luckmann, and Bruce made these observations decades and years before the
2016 election, in which Donald Trump (misogyny, racism, sexual immorality, and all) becomes
president thanks in great part to the support of white evangelicals who apparently not only have
abandoned their (to quote Bruce) “behavioral distinctiveness,” but have given up applying their
Christian faith to their politics (except in the very narrow sense of opposing Roe v. Wade). As
evinced by their willingness to ignore the ongoing scandals of the Trump administration, much
of white evangelicalism in America has become fused with the white nationalist Republican
Party of Donald Trump. It is very easy to document that the Christian Right is the most
significant constituency in the Republican Party. But as many, many commentators along the
political spectrum have pointed out, and agonized over, it is much harder to delineate what
makes the Christian Right Christian, or religious.
There is a great deal of evidence that the Christian Right is playing a significant role in
driving people to disaffiliate from religion. Whether we explain this phenomenon as contributing
to secularization or to polarization does not change the fact that the Christian Right is a sign of
secularization. Not to put too fine a point on it, the Christian Right is itself powerful evidence for
the secularizing of America.
Conclusion
So how should we think about the fact that the Christian Right – itself a sign of
secularization – is clearly a significant factor in driving people into religious nonaffiliation? As a
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scholar of American evangelicalism, I appreciate what one might refer to as the unmasking of the
Christian Right, and the clarity with which we can now understand (much of) white
evangelicalism. As noted above, for the past century the bulk of white evangelicalism in America
has been tightly linked to a very conservative politics. But in response to the 1960s and 1970s –
in response to movements in behalf of civil rights, women’s rights, and gay/lesbian rights, and in
response to increasing religious pluralism and Court decisions in behalf of the separation of
church and state – conservative white evangelicalism organized itself into the Christian Right, in
the process attaching itself and making itself increasingly indispensable to the Republican Party.
In the days of Jerry Falwell, Sr. and the Moral Majority, the claim was that this was all about
Christian values, all about rescuing America from sinking into a morass of immorality. So, for
example, the Christian Right’s aggressive campaign against President Bill Clinton was explained
as an attack on his egregious sexual sins and in defense of a now-bygone virtuous Christian
America. But now, with the Christian Right’s enthusiastic support of Donald Trump – led in part
by Jerry Falwell, Jr. – their cover is blown. We can now see (some of us had already seen) that
the Christian Right is not about personal morality and Christian/religious values, but is instead
about a particular right-wing politics – a politics in keeping with the history of fundamentalism –
involving white nationalism, hostility to immigrants, unfettered capitalism (which includes a
disinterest, at the least, in global warming), and intense homophobia.
So as a scholar, I appreciate the clarity that we now have about (much of) white
evangelicalism, the clarity about what the Christian Right is all about, and the clarity about the
fact that the Christian Right is but one more sign of the secularizing of America. That said, it is
of course true that one could argue that it is not just (much of) white evangelicalism and the
Christian Right that has been unmasked. One could argue that Christianity itself has been
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unmasked, that the above values – white nationalism, homophobia, and the like – are actually
Christian (maybe even religious) values. Certainly many of those who abandon religion because
of the Christian Right have come to something like this conclusion. And I get it. It makes sense
to me. If I thought the Christian Right = Christianity, or Christian Right = religion, I would want
nothing to do with it, either.
But as a person of faith, I understand Christianity to be something else. I understand it to
be centered in the Gospels, in the message (stated quite clearly in Matthew 25) that in the end we
are to be judged on how we treat our brothers and sisters, on how we treat “the other.” So while
I appreciate the clarity with which we can now see (much of) white evangelicalism, I am also
saddened by the fact that the secularizing of America occurs in part because the Christian Right
has been so successful in articulating what it means to be Christian.
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